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COMMENTS
NEW YORK'S "UNFORTUNATE EVENT" TEST: ITS
APPLICATION PRIOR TO THE EVENTS OF 9/11
I. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked two airplanes
from Boston's Logan Airport.' After American Airlines Flight 11 struck the
North Tower of the World Trade Center,2 some employees of the investment
banking and brokerage firm, Keefe Bruyette & Woods, ran to the windows
of the firn's headquarters in the South Tower.' The co-CEO emerged from
his office and exclaimed, "[wihat the hell was that?"4 The traders, however,
remained at their desks;5 some even chided those who abandoned their com-
puter screens to see what happened.6 Shortly thereafter, United Airlines
Flight 175 struck close to the top of the South Tower,7 trapping the firm's
employees on the 8 8 h and 89h floors.' Between the first and second air-
planes hitting the twin towers, an announcement came over the intercom that
the South Tower was secure and structurally sound and employees could re-
turn to their floors.9 Some reports even indicate that the message said em-
ployees should return to their offices unless otherwise authorized by a com-
pany representative.' 0
Later that morning, both towers collapsed." Still later, another building,
Seven World Trade Center, fell. 2 '"The terrorist attack on the World Trade
1. Elizabeth J. Stewart, Insurance Coverage Can Expand or Shrink Based on How You
Count Occurrences, THE METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., NE. ED., May 2002, at 15.
2. Id.
3. Juliette Fairley, Book Recounts Tale of Company's Rebirth; Keefe Bruyette & Woods
Lost 67 Workers in the Sept. II Attacks, USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 2002, at B7.
4. Matthew Kauffman, Back from the Brink; One Year Later, KBW Marks Progress on
Road to Recovery, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 11, 2002, at El.
5. Fairley, supra note 3.
6. Kauffman, supra note 4.
7. Stewart, supra note 1.
8. Kauffman, supra note 4.
9. Fairley, supra note 3.
10. Id.
11. Stewart, supra note 1.
12. Id. Seven World Trade Center, was a 47-story building at the north end of the 16-acre
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Center did damage to human lives for which no amount of money can pro-
vide adequate compensation."13 "It also did massive property damage for
which monetary compensation is possible."14
The extent of the liability of the insurance carriers may ultimately depend
upon the resolution of the following question: Which of the two following
statements best describes what caused the destruction of the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001?
1) In a single coordinated attack, terrorists flew hijacked planes into the
twin towers of the World Trade Center.
2) At 8:46 A.M. on the morning of September l1th, a hijacked airliner
crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, and 16 min-
utes later a second hijacked plane struck the South Tower. I5
The answer to that question will certainly be a significant factor in de-
ciding how to redevelop the World Trade Center complex site.16 Normally,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 7 would "ex-
World Trade Center complex site, was subject to a separate lease. Christopher J. Sullivan, As
Dust Settles, Thorny Real Estate Issues Arise, THE NAT'L L.J., Feb. 18, 2002, at B13.
13. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL
1163577, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2002). "More than 2,800 people died, including 343 fire-
fighters and 23 police officers, when twin towers of the center collapsed after being struck by
two hijacked aircraft in the September 1 attack blamed by the United States on the al Qaeda
movement of Osama bin Laden." WTC Insurer Welcomes Port Authority Land Swap Talk,
FACTIVA GLOBAL INS. NEWS DIG., Aug. 5, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4443700.
14. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL
1163577, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2002). "Larry Silverstein, who owns the 99-year lease on
the demolished Twin Towers, has submitted expert reports, which ... estimate the cash value
of the Twin Towers, buildings 4 and 5, and the retail mall at $5.7 billion." WTC Insurance
Fight Continues; 'Billions of Dollars Apart' over Settlement, NEWSDAY, Aug. 6, 2002, avail-
able at 2002 WL 2756870. "[A]n attorney in Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, the New York
law firm representing Mr. Silverstein's interests ... said that this figure represents replace-
ment cost minus depreciation of the two towers and surrounding edifices." E. E. Mazier, War
of Words Rages Over WTC Coverage, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK &
BENEFITS MGMT. ED., Aug. 12, 2002, available at WL 9936159. "[tjhe reports indicate that
business interruption losses, which Silverstein would receive if he rebuilds the complex, are
estimated at more than $2.5 billion." WTC Insurance Fight Continues; 'Billions of Dollars
Apart' over Settlement, supra. This amount would cover Silverstein's lease payments to the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Eric Herman, CEO of World Trade Center's
Lead Insurer Says Settlement Agreement Unlikely, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Aug. 8,
2002, available at 2002 WL 25437142. "That would bring the total amount to $8.2 billion,
which ... exceeds the amount Silverstein is seeking." WTC Insurance Fight Continues; 'Bil-
lions of Dollars Apart' over Settlement, supra.
15. No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL 1163577, at *2.
16. Christopher J. Sullivan, As Dust Settles, Thorny Real Estate Issues Arise, THE NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 18, 2002, at B13.
17. On September 22, 2001, Congress enacted the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act, which grants relief to the airline industry, established the September 11 th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 and provides that "[tlhe US [sic] District Court for the
Southern District of New York shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions
[Vol. 39
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pect to find the answer to the question whether the events of September 1 lth
constituted one or two 'occurrences' by looking at how the parties to the in-
surance contract [the Silverstein Parties' 8 and twenty-two insurance compa-
nies, 9] defined that term in the policy they negotiated. 2 °
"[H]owever, with minor exceptions, there were no insurance policies in
place on September 11," 2001.21 This is because in July 2001, after an "ex-
tensive bidding process," the Silverstein Parties entered into a ninety-nine
year lease for the World Trade Center complex with the Port Authority of
brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death) re-
suiting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of 11 September 2001 [sic]."'
Laurie Kamaiko, World Trade Centre; Who Will Foot the Bill?, REINSURANCE MAG., Aug.
13, 2002 (quoting Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
42, § 408(b)(3), 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001)[hereinafter Air Transportation and Safety System
Stabilization Act]). That court must apply the substantive law of the State of New York.
Raymond L. Mariani, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 and the Pro-
tection of the Airline Industry: A Bill for the American People, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 141, 171
(2002) (citing Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act).
18. The Silverstein Parties include: "World Trade Center Properties LLC, Silverstein
Properties Inc., Silverstein WTC Management Co. LLC, I World Trade Center LLC, 2 World
Trade Center LLC, 4 World Trade Center LLC, 5 World Trade Center LLC." No. 01 Civ.
9291, 2002 WL 1163577, at *1 n.l.
19. The twenty-two insurance companies include: "Allianz Insurance Company, Copen-
hagen Reinsurance Co. (UK) Ltd., Employers Insurance of Wausau, Federal Insurance Com-
pany, Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC, Gulf Insurance Company, Hartford Fire Insurance
Company, Houston Casualty Company, Industrial Risk Insurers, Lexington Insurance Co.,
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, QBE International Insurance Limited, Royal In-
demnity Company, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Swiss Reinsurance Co. UK LTD.
(Swiss Re), TIG Insurance Co., Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co., Twin City Fire Insur-
ance Co., Wurttembergishce Versicherung AG and Zurich American Insurance Co." Id. at *2.
"Swiss Reinsurance Co. underwrote about 22 percent-$780 million--of the World Trade
Center's insurance coverage." Alison Frankel, Double Indemnity, AM. LAW., Sept. 2002, at
81. Therefore, if Swiss Re loses the trial, it faces insurance losses of "$1.5 to $1.6 billion."
Nieck Ammerlaan, Swiss Re Says U.S. Ruling Strongly Supports its Case, Dow JONES
REUTERS Bus. INTERACTIVE, Sept. 26, 2002 available at www.factiva.com (document no.
lba0000020020926dy9p00u3e). On September 25, 2002, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Royal
Indem. Co. and St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., which limited their liability to only one
payment on the face amount of their respective policies. 222 F. Supp. 2d 385, 399. The three
companies provided about $112 million in coverage for the World Trade Center complex. Bill
Rigby, Court Says Three Insurers to Pay Only One WTC Claim, Dow JONES REUTERS Bus.
INTERACTIVE, Sept. 26, 2002 available at www.factiva.com (document no.
lbaOOOOO2002O925dy9p010ff). This ruling "means that 17 of the original 22 insurers" who
took shares in the policy on the World Trade Center complex remained in the litigation at the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. See id. Two Bermuda-based insur-
ers previously settled with Mr. Silverstein "on the basis that the attack was one event." Id. In
February, 2002, Ace Bermuda Insurance, Ltd. (Ace) and XL Insurance (Bermuda) Ltd. (XL)
agreed to pay $67 million and $298 million, respectively, for a total of $365 million. Meg
Green, Silverstein Asks to Delay WTC Lawsuit, BEsTWIRE, Sept. 27, 2002. Ace and XL spe-
cifically referred to the WilProp form, a specific insurance form provided by Willis of New
York, Inc., the broker for the Silverstein Parties, in their binders. Frankel, supra.
20. No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL 1163577, at *2.
21. Id.
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New York and New Jersey.2" "[A]lthough each of the insurers had signed
binders setting forth in summary form their agreement to provide property
damage coverage[, s]ome of these binders expressly stated that the precise
language was 'to be agreed upon."'23 As a result, the extent of liability of the
various insurance companies to provide compensation to those who had an
ownership interest in the World Trade Center complex is an issue. 4
Although [The] Travelers [Insurance Company (Travelers)] had not issued
a policy as of September 11 th, three days later, it issued a policy providing
$210,620,990 in property damage insurance for the World Trade Center
"per occurrence." Despite the fact that the media had already reported the
controversy over whether the attack on the World Trade Center constituted
one or two "occurrences" for insurance purposes, the policy Travelers is-
sued did not define the term "occurrence. ' 25
However, the other insurers argue that, at the time they issued their
binders, they agreed to be bound by the WilProp form (WilProp), a specific
insurance form provided by Willis of New York, Inc., the broker for the
Silverstein Parties. 26 The insurers allege the WilProp "contained a definition
of 'occurrence' under which the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center is
unambiguously a single occurrence. '"27
The Silverstein Parties make two arguments. On the one hand, they ar-
gue that although the insurers' reading of the WilProp's definition of occur-
rence is the most reasonable one, it is "not the only reasonable reading, and
... therefore the question of the number of occurrences under the WilProp
form must be decided by a jury."2 The Silverstein Parties' second argument
is that the definition of the term "occurrence" is not incorporated into the
binders and that upon signing the binders, the insurance companies "were
well aware that they were committing to participate in a process in which
they would ultimately agree to be bound by the contract terms negotiated by
22. Id. at *1.
23. Id. at *2.
24. Id. at *1. In addition to the Silverstein Parties, those who had an ownership interest in
the World Trade Center complex include Westfield Inc., The Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corporation, UBS Warburg Real Estate Invest-
ments Inc., Westfield America Inc. and Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota N.A. as trustee for the
registered holders of GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. Mortgage-Backed Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2001-WTC. Id.
25. Id. at *2.
26. 222 F. Supp. 2d at 387.
27. Id. According to the WilProp,
"Occurrence" shall mean all losses or damages that are attributable directly or indi-
rectly to one cause or to one series of similar causes. All such losses will be added
together and the total amount of such losses will be treated as one occurrence irre-
spective of the period of time or area over which such losses occur.
Id. at 398.
28. Id. at 388.
[Vol. 39
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the insureds and the lead underwriter ..... Travelers. 29 Therefore, as of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the insurers were bound to the terms to which the
Silverstein Parties and Travelers agreed. 3' Because the term "occurrence" is
not defined in that policy, the Silverstein Parties contend that the insurance
companies should be "bound by the meaning given to that term in the deci-
sions of the courts of the State of New York, where the coverage was negoti-
ated."'"
New York courts use the "unfortunate event" test to define the term
"occurrence."32 Because Travelers did not define that term in its policy, 33 it
appears likely that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals will have an opportunity to
apply New York's "unfortunate event" test, at least in connection with that
policy. The Silverstein Parties purchased $3.55 billion of property and busi-
ness interruption insurance for the World Trade Center complex.34 Whether
they are entitled to receive a greater amount is likely to be determined by
how faithfully the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals apply New York's "unfortunate
event" test.
This Comment discusses how New York State and federal district courts
previously applied the "unfortunate event" test where the number of occur-
rences was an issue. Part II begins with a brief summary of the three tests
used in the United States to determine the number of occurrences. The first
application of the "unfortunate event" test in connection with the term "acci-
dent" was in 1959."5 Fourteen years later, courts applied the "unfortunate
event" test in connection with the term "occurrence."3 6 Part III discusses the
application of New York's "unfortunate event" test in different insurance
and reinsurance contexts. It appears that courts apply New York's "unfortu-
nate event" test less consistently in third-party contexts than in first-party
contexts. However, there were only a few first-party cases before New York
State and federal courts prior to September 11, 2001. Since September 11,
2001, the Court of Appeals of New York decided two reinsurance cases
where the number of occurrences was an issue. 37 Those cases could have a
29. Id. Travelers, which is "one of six primary insurers of the trade center, has admitted
that its policy governs at least in its own case." Tamara Loomis, Insurance Lawyers Debate
Payment for Terrorist Attack, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 2002, at 1. Therefore, at least one insurer
does not have the term "occurrence" defined in its policy.
30. 222 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
31. No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL 1163577, at *2.
32. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Wesolowski, 305 N.E.2d 907, 910 (N.Y. 1973).
33. No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL 1163577 at *2.
34. Id. at *1.
35. See Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 164 N.E.2d 714, 706
(N.Y. 1959).
36. See Wesolowski, 305 N.E.2d at 910.
37. See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 760
N.E.2d 319, 322 (N.Y. 2001).
20031
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considerable impact on future judicial decisions affecting the companies that
sold reinsurance policies to the insurers of the World Trade Center com-
plex.38 Finally, Part IV concludes with an approach which may result in a
more consistent application of New York's "unfortunate event" test in the
aftermath of the attack(s) on the World Trade Center's twin towers.
II. EARLY APPLICATIONS OF THE "UNFORTUNATE EVENT" TEST: THE
POLICY BEHIND THE RULE
Courts in the United States have used three tests to define the term "oc-
currence."3 9 A majority of states follow the "cause" test, which examines the
cause or causes of bodily injury or property damage.40 States applying this
test conclude that, "where there are losses to more than one person or entity,
the number of occurrences should be determined by looking at the underly-
ing cause of the loss or liability.""' Therefore, the losses are treated as one
occurrence "as long as multiple injuries or instances of property damage are
the direct result of a single action or event."42
The "effects" test, followed by a minority of courts, "focuses on each
injury or incident of damage to determine the number of occurrences. 4 3
Courts applying this test "look at the individual claimants or instances of
property damage to determine the number of occurrences."" Some courts
"view the 'effects' test as more appropriate where the injuries or damage
complained of arise at different locations and at different times.- 45
New York courts utilize a third test, the "unfortunate event" test, to de-
fine an occurrence.46 Often viewed as a variant of the "cause" test,47 the un-
derlying principle of the "unfortunate event" test is "that the cause of the in-
jury or damage must be an event close to the injury or damage itself."48
However, the "unfortunate event" and "cause" tests are distinguished be-
cause in the "unfortunate event" test, the cause is the "immediate unfortunate
38. Carl J. Pernicone & James T.H. Deaver, Insurance Implications of the World Trade
Center Disaster, 31 SPG BRIEF 23, 28 (2002).
39. Stewart, supra note I (citing Michael P. Sullivan, Annotation, What Constitutes Sin-
gle Accident or Occurrence Within Liability Policy Limiting Insurer's Liability to a Specified
Amount per Accident or Occurrence, 64 A.L.R.4th 668 (1988)).
40. Id.
41. Jeannine Chanes & Mary Daniels, One Occurrence or Two: How the Courts Decide;
Terrorist Attacks Liability Court Decision, RISK MGMT., Jan. 1, 2002, at 32.
42. Id.
43. Stewart, supra note 1.
44. Chanes & Daniels, supra note 41.
45. Id.
46. Wesolowski, 305 N.E.2d at 910.
47. See Stewart, supra note 1.
48. Chanes & Daniels, supra note 41.
[Vol. 39
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event," or one that is "close[st] to the actual injury or loss, resulting in the
harm."49
A. Case of First Impression: "How Many Accidents Within the Meaning of
the Policy?"50
In Arthur A. Johnson Corporation v. Indemnity Insurance Company of
North America, the Court of Appeals of New York held "that the collapses
of'separate walls, of separate buildings at separate times, were in fact sepa-
rate disastrous events and, thus, two different accidents within the meaning
of the policy."51 In Arthur Johnson, a protecting wall erected by a contractor
in front of the basement of a building collapsed under the water pressure
caused by a heavy rainfall, which flooded the building's basement.52 Almost
an hour later, another temporary wall the contractor erected to protect an ad-
joining, but separate building, gave way causing water to flood the second
building too.53 There was "no suggestion that the collapse of the first wall
caused the failure of the second."54 The contractor's liability policy provided
property damage coverage of $50,000 for "each accident."55
To determine how many accidents were within the meaning of the con-
tractor's insurance policy, the Court said it "must construe the word 'acci-
dent' as would the ordinary man on the street or ordinary person when he
purchases and pays for insurance."56 The Court considered three categories
of authorities in evaluating the soundest approach to the question "of
whether, in a given set of circumstances when the damage is to several per-
sons, there is one or more accidents within the meaning of the clause limit-
ing coverage to a certain amount per accident... ."" The first class of cases
the Court considered and rejected was "'where ... one negligent act or
omission is the sole proximate cause, or causa causans, there is, as a general
rule, but one accident, even though there be several resultant injuries or
losses."'58 This is the "cause" test.
The second approach the Court considered and rejected was "to hold
that each person who has suffered a loss has suffered an accident."59 Under
49. Id.
50. Arthur A. Johnson Corp., 164 N.E.2d at 706.
51. Id. at708.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 705.
56. Id. at 706 (citation omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 706 (quoting Hyer v. Inter-Insurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of
Southern California, 77 Cal. App. 343, 350 (2d Dist. 1926) (omission in original)).
59. Id. at 706.
2003]
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the English rule,6' the number of persons damaged determines the number of
accidents.6 The English rule is also known as the "effects" test.62
The third approach the Court considered, which it believed the soundest,
was to use the term "accident" in its "common sense of 'an event of an un-
fortunate character that takes place without one's foresight or expecta-
tion. . ."' or "an unexpected, unfortunate occurrence. ' 63 The Court believed
the approach of determining simply whether there was one unfortunate event
or occurrence was the most practical of the three methods of construction
that had been advanced because "it corresponds most with what the average
person anticipates when he buys insurance and reads the 'accident' limita-
tion in the policy."' This approach later became known as the "unfortunate
event" test.
65
In applying this test, the Court reasoned, "if the walls were located
blocks away from each other on different job sites but subject to the same
rainfall, no one could contest that there were two accidents. 66 Therefore,
"the collapses of separate walls of separate buildings at separate times, were
in fact separate disastrous events and, thus, two different accidents within the
meaning of the policy. ' 67 The proximate cause was "separate negligent acts
of preparing and constructing separate walls. . ." and not the heavy rain-
fall. 68
However, the dissenting opinion reasoned that, because the collapse of
the two walls was the result of an overwhelming flood, the "deluge was a
single event," rather than separate accidents. 69 The dissent observed, "there
will always be more than one event wherever the person or property of more
than one is affected."7 Therefore, in essence, the dissent reasoned that the
"unfortunate event" test and the English rule, or "effects" test, were the
same.7' This initial dissatisfaction with the application of New York's "un-
fortunate event" test has been joined by other judges, who critically assessed
how courts resolved disputes where the number of occurrences was an issue,
at least in third-party contexts.72 One observer even characterized the U.S.
60. Id. at 709 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 707.
62. See Chanes & Daniels, supra note 41.
63. Arthur A. Johnson Corp., 164 N.E.2d at 707 (quoting Croshier v. Levitt, 5 N.Y.2d
259, 269 (1959)).
64. Id. at 708.
65. Chanes & Daniels, supra note 41.
66. Arthur A. Johnson Corp., 164 N.E.2d at 708.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 709 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Dicola v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n. (In re Prudential Lines,
Inc.), 158 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir. 1998) (Lay, J., dissenting); Champion Int'l Corp. v. Cont'l Cas.
Co., 546 F.2d 502, 508 (2d Cir. 1976) (Newman, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 39330
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District Court for the Southern District of New York as a "result-oriented
court ' 7 3 because of how it resolved disputes in which the number of occur-
rences was an issue.74
B. Extension of the "Unfortunate Event" Test to Number of Occurrences
In 1973, fourteen years after Arthur Johnson, in Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Company v. Wesolowski, the Court of Appeals of New York
equated the term "occurrence" with "accident. '75 Making no distinction be-
tween the words "accident" and "occurrence," the Court applied New York's
"unfortunate event" test in a case that arose under an automobile liability
policy.76 In Wesolowski, the Court determined that there was only one occur-
rence where two collisions "occurred but an instant apart," with an unbroken
continuum between the two impacts and "no intervening agent or operative
factor.-
77
The first of several factors cited by the Court in reaching its conclusion
was that the two collisions in were extremely temporally close.78 Also, it was
clear that the second collision did not have a cause independent from the first
collision.79 Finally, the Court noted that the police made a single accident re-
port at the time of the accident and made reference to "common understand-
ing and parlance."8
Should a settlement not be reached in the Silverstein Parties' dispute
with their insurance companies, a New York jury, subject to post-trial mo-
tions and appeals, would determine the verdict.81 Larry Silverstein and his
spokespeople have waged a public relations "campaign as to the need for in-
surance proceeds to rebuild" the World Trade Center complex,82 which one
of its insurance company adversaries characterize as wasteful.83 However,
the Silverstein Parties' efforts may ultimately seem like a wise investment if
they are able to use "common understanding and parlance" to their advan-
tage.
73. See Michael F. Aylward, Multiple 'Occurrences'-A Divisive Issue, 5 No. I
COVERAGE 39, 40 (1995).
74. See id.
75. In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 202 B.R. 13, 22 (1996) (citing Wesolowski, 305 N.E.2d
907; Arthur A. Johnson Corp., 164 N.E.2d 704).
76. Wesolowski, 305 N.E.2d at 910.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Kamaiko, supra note 17.
82. Id.
83. Ammerlaan, supra note 19. Swiss Re Chief Legal Officer, Markus Diethelm, "called
[Mr.] Silverstein's efforts, which have been backed by an aggressive media push, a 'colossal
waste of time and money."' Id.
20031
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III. APPLICATIONS OF THE "UNFORTUNATE EVENT" TEST
"The issue of number of occurrences [affects] which layer of insurance
responds [to a loss] and for how much. '84 "[D]epending upon how their in-
terests are affected in a particular case," the number of occurrences is "an is-
sue on which insurance companies take different positions."85 It has been
urged that "policyholders and their counsel ... exploit these differences, ar-
guing that the language [of the policy] is imprecise and, therefore, ambigu-
ous."86
A. Third-Party Contexts
Liability, or third-party, policies cover amounts that a policyholder must
pay to third-parties for damages to their interests.8 7 The U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York has been critically assessed as a "re-
sult-oriented court" because it sought "to 'maximize' coverage . . ." in sev-
eral third-party contexts.88 Although "sympath[etic] with the majority's ef-
fort to construe the [plain meaning of the words] of an insurance policy in
such a way [as to] provide[] payments to the insured,"8 9 Judge Newman dis-
sented from the opinion in Champion International Corporation v. Conti-
nental Casualty Company because "there [was] simply no basis for combin-
ing... separate events, widely separated in time and space, into one
'occurrence."' 9 A change in the application of New York's "unfortunate
event" test was noted by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York, which, in an earlier decision, relied upon a "long line of cases
applying the New York law's presumption that the 'occurrence' in an insur-
ance context is the underlying event that ultimately results in a filed claim or
claims."'" Several third-party cases are discussed, along with the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York's reconciliation of their
apparently inconsistent holdings.92
84. Randy Paar, Recovery is in the Details: Hot Issues in the Administration and Appli-
cation of General Liability Insurance Policies, 86 PRAC. L. INST., N.Y. PRAC. SKILLS COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 199, 211 (2000).
85. Id. at 212.
86. Id.
87. Richard Lewis, Insurance Law: Understanding the ABCs, 63 PRACTICING L. INST.,
LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 221, 229 (2002).
88. Aylward, supra note 73. Specifically, the court is more likely to find one occurrence
where the "insured face[s] hundreds of small claims that will be absorbed by policy deducti-
bles and self-retentions." Id. Conversely, "courts are more likely to find multiple 'occur-
rences' where the limits of liability are relatively low compared to the insured's total expo-
sure." Id.
89. Champion Int'l Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 546 F.2d at 506 (Newman, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 508 (Newman, J., dissenting).
91. In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 202 B.R. at 22.
92. Id. at 23-24.
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1. Combining Separate Events into One Occurrence
Champion International Corporation ("Champion") sold vinyl-coated
paneling, which began to split apart after it was sold to manufacturers of
houseboats, house trailers, motor homes and campers.93 As a self-insurer,
Champion had assumed the first $5,000 of any loss and looked to its two in-
surers for coverage after claims were asserted for damages incurred in excess
of that amount.94 The defective panels damaged approximately 1,400 vehi-
cles manufactured by Champion's 26 different customer companies during
the policy period.95 Damages were in excess of $1 million, the upper limits
of Continental Insurance Company's policy, 96 which was intended to cover
Champion's liability in excess of $100,000 caused by an occurrence. 97
"'[All1 property.., damage arising out of continuous or repeated exposure
to substantially the same general conditions [was] considered as arising out
of one occurrence.' 98 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that the contested language in the policy was ambiguous and
that Champion's interpretation of the policy was a reasonable one.99 This re-
sult created a single deductible for 1,400 claims.1"0
The only issue on appeal was the scope of the term "occurrence" in the
policies.' Because the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
there was no ambiguity in the policy, it was not necessary for the Court to
resort to New York's rules governing the construction of ambiguous insur-
ance policies.'0 2 In affirming the judgment of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, the Court held that there was only one oc-
currence because "the policy was not intended to gauge coverage on the ba-
sis of individual accidents giving rise to the claims, but rather on the under-
lying circumstances.' 0 3
The dissent noted that the "majority had strained the [policy's] occur-
rence language, which define[d] as one occurrence all personal injury and
property damage 'arising out of continuous or repeated exposure to substan-
tially the same general condition[s]." ' ' 4 The dissent concluded that the pan-
93. Champion Int'l Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 546 F.2d at 504.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. ld. at 504.
97. Id. at 505.
98. Id. (omission in original) (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 504.
100. Kenneth W. Erickson & Randall W. Bodner, Number of Occurrences: Single or
Multiple, and Effect on Aggregates and Deductibles, 419 PRAC. L. INST., COM. L. & PRAC.
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 403, 408 (1987).
101. 546 F.2d at 505.
102. ld.at506n.5.
103. Id. at 506.
104. Erickson & Bodner, supra note 100 (citing Champion Int'l Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co.,
546 F.2d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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els splitting apart at "widely different times and places were separate occur-
rences.""1 5 He predicted that, "although the majority's view would promote
coverage in this particular case, it would, if consistently applied, cap insured
limits in subsequent disputes."' 06
2. Business Purpose of the Parties
In Champion International Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company, a product liability insurance coverage case, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that an umbrella excess liability
policy's language [was] unambiguous and... that, based on the business
purpose of the parties and the plain meaning of the policy's language, all
of the individual claims of property damage... resulting from [the split-
ting apart of the insured's] plywood relate[d] back to one "occurrence"
which gave rise to the damage upon which the claims [were] based. 10 7
In Champion International v. Liberty Mutual, the Court discussed the
Second Circuit Court's opinion Champion International v. Continental
Casualty Corporation where it reaffirmed the two-year-old rule that "indi-
vidual instances of damage comprise one 'occurrence' where the underlying
cause of harm is the same."'0 8 At this juncture, the court appears to abandon
New York's "unfortunate event" test in favor of the "cause" test. One com-
mentator observed, "[a]lthough the New York Court of Appeals applies the
'unfortunate event' test, the Second Circuit has not always followed that
lead."' 09
3. Manufacture Versus Delivery
In Stonewall Insurance Company v. Asbestos Claims Management, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained its holding in Champion Interna-
tional v. Continental Casualty Company when it reversed the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York."0 According to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, the claims in Champion International that were
based on the installation of defective vinyl panels in more than a thousand
vehicles arose from a single occurrence, which was the insured's delivery of
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Champion Int'l Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 701 F. Supp. 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
108. Id. (citing Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 127 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)).
109. 4 ROBERT L. HAIG, N.Y. PRACT. SERIES § 52.6(b) (West 1995 & Supp. 2001) (citing
N.Y. INS. L. § 41.02[6] n.69 (Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr., ed., 1995).
110. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1214 (2d Cir.
1995).
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the panels to the manufacturers of the vehicles."1 In contrast, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Stonewall Insurance said the policyholder's li-
ability resulted, not from the manufacture of the asbestos-containing prod-
ucts, but rather from the policyholder's installation of those products, which
resulted in the presence of asbestos each time the products were installed on
the property of third parties." 2 Therefore, each location at which the policy-
holder's products were present constituted a separate installation of those
products and hence, a separate occurrence requiring the imposition of an-
other deductible." 3 The lower court held that a decision to manufacture and
sell asbestos-containing products was a single occurrence." 4
4. Presumption that "Occurrence" is the Underlying Event that Ultimately
Results in a Filed Claim or Claims115
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York as-
sessed New York's "unfortunate event" test in In re Prudential Lines, Inc." 6
Earlier, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York re-
versed and remanded the case for consideration of whether extrinsic evi-
dence resolved ambiguity in the term "occurrence." The district court held
that the term was ambiguous and that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York should have considered the parties' prac-
tices. "' In its first opinion, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York relied upon "the long line of cases applying the New York
law's presumption that the 'occurrence' in an insurance context is the under-
lying event that ultimately results in a filed claim or claims.""' 8 It observed,
"several courts which have applied Johnson's holding have broadly con-
strued a single 'occurrence' as encompassing the many injuries or claims
which have resulted from an underlying event, process or condition." 19
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ex-
plained that, in its earlier decision, a certain line of cases led it to conclude
that an "occurrence" was the general presence of asbestos on board the in-
111. Id. at 1213 (citing Champion Int'l Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 546 F.2d 502, 506 (2d
Cir. 1976)).
112. John H. Gross et al., "Occurrence" Policy Coverage: Overview and Recent Cases,
557 PRACTICING L. INST., LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 57, 77 (1997)
(citing Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1214 (2d Cir.
1995)).
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Stonewall Ins. Co., 73 F.3d at 1212-14).
115. Dicola v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n (In re Prudential Lines,
Inc.), 202 B.R. 13, 22 (1996).
116. Id. at 22-23.
117. Id. at 18.
118. Id. at22.
119. Id.
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sured's ships. 2° Meanwhile, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a
decision possibly casting doubt on the continuing validity of broadly con-
struing the term "occurrence" under New York law. 2' In Stonewall Ins. Co.
v. Asbestos Claims Management Corp., thousands of building owners sued
the insured, a leading manufacturer of asbestos containing materials from
1930 to 1981, for property damage caused by the insured's products. 122 The
deductible provision in the insured's property damage insurance policy al-
lowed one deductible per "occurrence.' 1 23 The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the "occurrence" was not the insured's general decision to
manufacture asbestos, but rather the installation of its asbestos-containing
products. 24 In that decision, where the insured was a manufacturer, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished the more recent holding from its
earlier one in Champion International Corp. v. Continental Casualty Com-
pany, where the insured was a wholesaler.125
However, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York said there was no indication that the parties attached a similar meaning
to the deductible provisions of the numerous insurance policies as applied to
asbestosis claims. 126 Because New York courts formulated a contra proferen-
tum rule 21 for insurance contracts, doubt must be resolved in favor of the
insured.128 Therefore, on remand, there was no reason for the Court to reject
its earlier determination that, as a matter of law, the "occurrence" was the
general presence of asbestos at each location where the insured's asbestos-
containing products had been installed.'29 This construction of the term "oc-
currence" permitted the insurer to apply only a single deductible for all the
asbestosis claims indemnified by each policy. 3 0
But nearly two years later the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
agreed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York and agreed with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York's holding that each asbestosis bodily injury claim was subject to a
single deductible.' 3' Because each claim against the insured arose from a
separate occurrence, each insured incurred a new per occurrence deductible,
120. Id.
121. Id. at 22-23 (citing Stonewall Ins. Co., 73 F.3d at 1178).
122. Id. at 23 (citing Stonewall Ins. Co., 73 F.3d at 1178).
123. Id. at 23 (citing Stonewall Ins. Co., 73 F.3d at 1178).
124. Id. at 23 (citing Stonewall Ins. Co., 73 F.3d at 1178).
125. Id. at 23.
126. Id. at 24.
127. This rule sometimes is referred to as omnia praesumuntur contra proferentum,
which literally means "all things are presumed against the offeror." ld.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Second Circuit Applies "Per Occurrence" Deductible to Each Asbestos Bodily In-
jury Claim, Rather than to All Claims Arising from Exposure on a Single Ship, 20 No. 19 INS.
LITIG. REP. 744 (1998).
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rather than the deductible being applied to all claims arising from exposure
on a single ship.'3 2 In order to establish the reasonable expectations of the
parties, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied New York's "unfortu-
nate event" test to determine the number of occurrences.' 33 It concluded that
each claimant's injuries represented a new occurrence because each claimant
was separately exposed to asbestos at different points in time.'34
The dissent argued that the majority had equated both the event and in-
jury in its definition of the term "occurrence."' 35 New York law did not sup-
port such a construction of the policy because each claimant's subsequent
exposure would also count as a separate occurrence under the majority's rea-
soning. 36 Because the insurance policy did not define the term "occurrence"
as the event and the resulting injury, common understanding would dictate
that an "unfortunate event" is one that causes an injury.'37 Therefore, com-
mon understanding of the term "occurrence" pointed to the underlying event,
rather than to the initial exposure to the insured's asbestos-containing prod-
ucts. 138
B. First-Party Property Claims by an Insured
Property insurance policies are first-party policies because they obligate
property insurance companies to pay benefits directly to policyholders for
losses they suffer to their own property or profits.'39 In addition to tangible
property, first-party policies cover intangible property, such as anticipated
profits and lost income both during and after a business interruption.' 4°
Courts recognized that the business purpose of the property insurance policy
is to protect specific property from designated perils, which distinguishes the
interpretation of the word "occurrence" in a property policy from its usage in
third-party policies.' 4 ' Although there are hundreds of cases construing the
number of "occurrences" in a third-party context, few courts have addressed
this issue in the context of first-party policies. 4 2 In New York, the "unfortu-
nate event" test has been applied to a relatively small number of first-party
contexts.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Dicola v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n. (In re Prudential Lines,
Inc.), 158 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir. 1998) (Lay, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 88 (Lay, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 90 (Lay, J., dissenting).
139. Lewis, supra note 87.
140. Id.
141. Edward J. Ozog, When the Roof Falls In... Defining "Occurrence" in Property
Insurance, 19 WTR BRIEF 8, 31 (1990).
142. Michael F. Aylward, Twin Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the World
Trade Center Attacks, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 169, 171 (2002).
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1. Physical Loss Due to Theft
In I Q Originals, Inc. v. Boston Old Colony Insurance Company, an in-
surer issued a policy covering "all risks of physical loss or damage to the in-
sured property from any cause whatsoever" to a wholesaler of merchan-
dise. "'3 The policy contained a clause limiting liability to not more than
$60,000 in any one shipment, loss, disaster or casualty.'" The insured's
truck, which contained five separate shipments of the insured's goods worth
$21,584, $39,620, $48,147, $69,135 and $88,095, respectively, was hi-
jacked.1 45 Before the hijacking, the insured's customer consolidated the five
shipments by repacking them on one truck at its New Jersey warehouse.1 46
In applying the "unfortunate event" test, the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, First Department determined that the hijacking consti-
tuted one event or occurrence, not five separate events or occurrences. 47
Therefore, the limitation of liability clause in the policy limited the insured's
recovery to $60,000.' The Court also held that the limitation of the insured
wholesaler's liability clause was unambiguous and that the policy's con-
struction presented a question of law.'49 Regarding whether the events of
September 11, 2001 constituted one or two occurrences, there is no defini-
tion of the term "occurrence" contained in at least one of the policies, that of
Travelers.' 50 Therefore, the facts of I Q Originals, Inc. v. Boston Old Colony
Insurance Company can be distinguished on that basis.
The dissenting opinion said there could be confusion as to the limitation
of liability clause's meaning because it was not sufficiently clear.' 5' There-
fore, the Court should have applied the rule that "insurance policies should
be construed according to the 'reasonable expectation and purpose of the or-
dinary businessman when making an ordinary business contract."" 52 The
dissent's reasoning is similar to the Silverstein Parties' argument that, al-
though the insurers' reading of the WilProp's definition of "occurrence" is
the most reasonable one, "it is not the only reasonable reading, and... there-
fore the question of the number of occurrences under the WilProp must be
decided by a jury."'15 3
143. I Q Originals, Inc. v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 447 N.Y.S.2d 174, 175 (1982)
(emphasis added).
144. I/.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 176.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 175.
150. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL
1163577, at *2.
151. See I Q Originals, Inc., 447 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
152. Id. (quoting Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 120 N.E. 86, 87 (N.Y. 1918)).
153. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., 222 F. Supp. 2d 385, 388
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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2. Loss Due to Theft by False Pretenses
In Great Northern Insurance Company v. Dayco Corporation, an in-
surer brought an action seeking declaratory judgment that it was not liable
under an "all risk" policy covering direct physical loss of all real and per-
sonal property of the insured.'54 The insured, a manufacturer and seller of
belts and hoses, failed to receive full payment for twelve shipments of goods
that were lost.155 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York observed that the rule in the Second Circuit was in accord with the
"proposition that 'an occurrence is determined by the cause or causes of the
resulting injury."'156 Therefore, the insured's loss was a multiple, rather than
a single, loss. 15
7
The Court also referred to the absence of a comprehensive definition of
"occurrence" as a basis for finding ambiguity and therefore compelling cov-
erage for multiple "losses" under the property policy.'58 This reasoning is
similar to the Silverstein Parties' argument that U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York should apply New York's "unfortunate
event" test because Travelers' World Trade Center complex policy does not
contain a definition of the term "occurrence."' 59 In Great Northern Insur-
ance Company v. Dayco Corporation, the language of the policy did not
clearly limit coverage. 6° "To the extent that the absence of broader 'occur-
rence' wordings created ambiguity in the policy, the court held that the am-
biguity had to be resolved in favor of the insured."'' This reasoning is also
similar to the Silverstein Parties' argument that the WilProp's definition of
occurrence is "not the only reasonable reading, and ... therefore the ques-
tion of the number of occurrences under the WilProp form must be decided
by a jury."' 62
154. Great N. Ins. Co. v. Dayco Corp., 620 F. Supp. 346, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
155. Id. at 348, 349.
156. Id. at 354 (citing Bus. Interiors, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 751 F.2d 361, 363
(10th Cir. 1984); Michigan Chem. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d 374, 379 (6th
Cir. 1984); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1982);
Champion Int'l Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 546 F.2d 502, 504 (2d Cir. 1976)).
157. Id. at 355.
158. Twin Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the World Trade Center At-
tacks, supra note 142, at 171-72 (citing Great N. Ins. Co. v. Dayco Corp., 620 F. Supp. at
354).
159. See SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL
1163577, at *2.
160. Twin Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the World Trade Center At-
tacks, supra note 142, at 174-75 (citing Great N. Ins. Co. v. Dayco Corp., 620 F. Supp. at
354).
161. Id. at 175 (referring to Great N. Ins. Co. v. Dayco Corp., 620 F. Supp. at 354).
162. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., 222 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
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3. Property Damage Due to Natural Causes
In Newmont Mines Limited v. Hanover Insurance Company, the insured
brought an action for indemnification under two property damage policies
arising out of the collapse of two separate sections of the roof of the in-
sured's building.163 Each of the two collapses occurred on a different day,
but each had the same cause, concentration of snow on the roof.1 64 The two
insurance companies were among four that provided layered insurance cov-
erage against a variety of perils, including collapse caused by the weight of
ice and snow.' 65 In the dispute with their insurers, the Silverstein Parties ar-
gue that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
should apply New York's "unfortunate event" test because Travelers' policy
does not contain a definition of the term "occurrence.' 66 Like Travelers'
World Trade Center complex policy, the two policies at issue in Newmont
Mines Limited v. Hanover Insurance Company did not contain a definition
of the term "occurrence."'
' 67
In Newmont Mines Limited v. Hanover Insurance Company, the two in-
surers contended that both collapses should constitute only one occurrence
for coverage purposes because the collapses were caused by the same condi-
tion, excessive buildup of snow on the roof of the building.' 68 However, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished property damage from prod-
uct liability insurance policies. 69 It noted, "when construing a property dam-
age policy, ... the business purpose sought to be achieved by the parties is
considerably different.' 70 Because the goal of a first-party policy is "to
provide financial protection against damage to property," the parties "in-
tended to provide coverage for property damage each time it occurred unex-
pectedly and without design, unless the damage occurring at one point in
time was merely part of a single, continuous event that already had caused
other damage.""' "The business purposes to be achieved by property insur-
ance are ... expressed in the nature of the policy protections and the
negotiations of the parties. '"17' Therefore, the construction and interpretation
of the parties should control for purposes of construing the term "occur-
163. Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 127, 129 (2d Cir. 1986).
164. Id. at 130.
165. Id. at 131.
166. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL
1163577, at *2.
167. Ozog, supra note 141, at 28.
168. Newmont Mines Ltd v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d at 134.
169. Id. at 136. See also Champion Int'l Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 701 F. Supp. at
412.
170. Newmont Mines Ltd v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d at 136.
171. Id.
172. Ozog, supra note 141, at 11.
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the parties should control for purposes of construing the term "occur-
rence."'
173
In Newmont Mine Limited v. Hanover Insurance Company, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals was concerned about time and space having sig-
nificance in ordinary business relations because the causal analysis was too
dependent on the construed timing of events comprising an "occurrence."' 74
If the first roof collapse would have been adjusted and paid without full
knowledge of the cause, then the ordinary pursuit of business relationships
would have certainly resulted in two occurrences.'75 Therefore, "[t]he cause
analysis... failed to recognize the business purpose of the property pol-
icy.'
176
Although the Court did not explicitly cite Arthur Johnson, the reasoning
is similar. Just as the Court of Appeals of New York in Arthur Johnson
viewed the proximate cause as the separate negligent acts of the insured in
preparing and constructing separate walls and not the heavy rainfall, 7 7 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals declined to look at the snowstorm as the
only cause of the damage because the two collapses were unrelated.'78 Be-
cause the jury received proper instruction to find separate insured losses
unless the losses were part of a single continuous event,'79 the Court upheld
a finding that the two collapses were separate occurrences within the mean-
ing of the insurance policies' 80
The approach in Newmont Mines has elements of both the "cause" and
"effect" analysis. 8' The Court emphasized the lack of evidence presented at
trial of any clear common "cause" and cited several factors supporting its
decision to uphold the jury's finding. 8 2 First, "the two collapses occurred at
least three, and perhaps as many as seventeen, days apart."' 83 Also, the in-
sured's structural engineering expert testified that the buildings were de-
signed as separate structures. 84 Therefore, the first collapse did not cause or
contribute to the second, and the second collapse was not merely a continua-
173. Id. at 12-13.
174. Id. at 27.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Arthur A. Johnson Corp., 164 N.E.2d at 708.
178. Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d at 136-37.
179. Twin Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the World Trade Center At-
tacks, supra note 142, at 174 (citing Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d at
135).
180. Newmont Mines Ltd., 784 F.2d at 137.
181. Twin Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the World Trade Center At-
tacks, supra note 142, at 174 (discussing Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d
at 127).
182. Id. (citing Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d at 135-36).
183. Newmont Mines Ltd., 784 F.2d at 137.
184. Id.
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tion of the earlier one.185 The expert's opinion was that the two collapses
were separate events.' 86 In answering the question of whether the events of
September 11, 2001 constituted one or two occurrences, expert testimony
provided by both sides could be crucial because it would determine whether
the second tower was likely to have collapsed anyway even if it had it not
been struck. 18
7
In Newmont Mines, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals observed that,
although "the cause of the insured's liabilities might be an appropriate focus
for third-party coverage, the subject matter of first-party insurance is the
damaged property itself."' 88 "A liability policy is intended to protect an indi-
vidual or a business from liability from their tortuous conduct."' 89 Because
that is the "business purpose sought to be achieved by the parties, it is emi-
nently reasonable to look to the underlying conduct or cause of that liabil-
ity. '" 90 However, the "cause" test may conflict with the business purpose of
property insurance, which is to provide financial protection against damage
to property.' 9' Therefore, there is a considerable difference when construing
a property damage policy. 92 "In accordance with this [business] purpose, the
parties must have intended to provide coverage for property damage each
time it occurred unexpectedly and without design, unless the damage occur-
ring at one point in time was merely part of a single, continuous event that
already had caused other damage."' 93 The contrast in the business purposes
of third-party and first-party policies that the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. For Travelers,
Harvey Kurzweil of [New York-based] Dewey Ballantine [has argued] that the at-
tack on the second tower, which occurred 16 minutes after the first plane hit the
North Tower of the World Trade Center, could hardly be considered a "remote
cause," in part because the destruction of either building would have resulted in the
destruction of the supporting infrastructure of the other. And Mr. Kurzweil raised
the possibility that expert testimony would show that the destruction of either one
of the two towers would have brought the second to the ground.
Mark Hamblett, Not Quick End to Trade Center Insurance Case, N.Y.L.J., June 4, 2002, at 1.
Swiss Re's counsel has said, "there is 'substantial engineering evidence' that even without the
second plane, the first plane would have caused both towers to collapse because of the com-
mon systems that connected" them. Tamara Loomis, Insurance Lawyers Debate Payment for
Terrorist Attack, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 2002, at 1. Mr. Silverstein's counsel has said the issue is
"a total and complete red herring." Id. Mr. Silverstein himself was equally dismissive, saying
"that the twin towers stood on separate foundations, and the fact that underground concourses
connected them did not make the foundations dependent upon each other." Id.
188. Twin Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the World Trade Center At-
tacks, supra note 142, at 171 (citing Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d at
136).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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peals discussed in Newmont Mines was also noted by U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York. 94 In Burroughs Wellcome Company v.
Commercial Union Insurance Company, the district court reasoned, "[s]o
long as the subsequent injury may be considered a consequence of the first,
it may be considered part of the same 'accident."1
95
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals described this cause analysis as
"absurd" in the first-party context of Newmont Mines and distinguished the
cause approach followed in Champion International because it involved
products liability. 196 Newmont Mines suggests that, "in property damage
cases, courts should consider whether the damage was part of a single con-
tinuous event, [and] not whether the damage occurring at one point in time
had a similar cause to damage occurring another time."
1 97
C. Post-9/11 Reinsurance Cases
Since September 11, 2001, the New York Court of Appeals has ad-
dressed the number of "occurrences" question in the context of two cases in-
volving reinsurance policies, which were resolved by the Court in a single
opinion. 9 s In Travelers Casualty and Surety Company v. Certain Under-
writers at Lloyd's of London, the Court of Appeals decided "whether losses
from environmental injury claims involving decades of commercial activities
at numerous industrial and waste disposal sites may properly be aggregated
as a single 'disaster and/or casualty' under certain reinsurance treaties."' 99
"The treaties define[d] 'each and every loss' as 'all loss arising out of any
one disaster and/or casualty under coverage of any or all insureds of the
Companies.... "200 The definition of "disaster and/or casualty" was
each and every accident, occurrence and/or causative incident, it being...
understood that all loss resulting from a series of accidents, occurrences
and/or causative incidents having a common origin and/or being traceable
to the same act, omission, error and/or mistake shall be considered as hav-
ing resulted from a single accident, occurrence and/or causative inci-
dent.201
194. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1213, 1221
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussing Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d at 136-37).
195. Id. (citing Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d at 137).
196. Erickson & Bodner, supra note 100, at 410 (citing Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover
Ins. Co., 784 F.2d at 136-37).
197. David Marshall Moriarty & David A. Martland, Insurance Coverage Issues for
Toxic Chemicals or Hazardous Waste Claims, 316 PRAC. L. INST., LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC.
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 207, 261-62 (1986).
198. Pernicone & Deaver, supra note 38, at 27.
199. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 760
N.E.2d at 322.
200. Id. at 323 (emphasis in original).
201. Id.
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The reinsured, Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, (Travelers
Surety) contended that the plain language of the reinsurance treaties required
the "widest possible search for a unifying factor among the underlying
claims."2"2 This "would mean Travelers [Surety] could surmount the reten-
tion limits in the treaties and thus be entitled to a recovery."2 3 However, the
reinsurers challenged Travelers Surety's single allocations of its losses based
on the contractual language in the reinsurance treaties.2"4 In finding "that the
necessary relationship did not exist between the dozens of sites belonging to
each insured, which were 'separated spatially by thousands of miles and
temporally by decades,' the Court said that the phrase 'series of' created a
requirement of a temporal and spatial relationship among the accidents to be
aggregated under the wording."20 5 Therefore, Travelers Surety's "attempt to
treat the disparate environmental claims in each case, respectively, as one
'disaster and/or casualty' for the purposes of allocating [the] cost [of these
claims] to its reinsurance treaties was barred by the policy language. ' 206
Unlike Travelers' World Trade Center complex policy, 27 there was lan-
guage in the reinsurance treaties that defined the term "occurrence. 20 8 How-
ever, the words "series of' are used in the WilProp. °9 One of Mr.
Silverstein's arguments is that the WilProp's definition of occurrence rea-
sonably allows for two occurrences. 210 Therefore, Mr. Silverstein's argument
that the insurers' reading of the WilProp's definition of occurrence is not the
only reasonable one and must be decided by a jury211 may be similar to the
one made by Travelers Surety as the reinsured in these two cases.
The Court's multiple events analysis seems to support the Silverstein
Parties' position that the events of September 11, 2001 were two separate
occurrences for purposes of insurance coverage for the collapse of the World
Trade Center's Twin Towers. 21 2 In reaching its conclusion that under the
facts and reinsurance contracts at issue, the aggregation of those losses was
"beyond the scope of the applicable treaties," 213 the Travelers Casualty and
202. Id. at 326.
203. Pernicone & Deaver, supra note 38, at 27.
204. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 760
N.E.2d at 325-26.
205. Pemicone & Deaver, supra note 38, at 28.
206. Id.
207. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL
1163577, at *2.
208. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 760
N.E.2d at 323.
209. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., 222 F. Supp. 2d at 398.
210. Id. at 388.
211. Id.
212. Twin Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the World Trade Center At-
tacks, supra note 142, at 169 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London, 760 N.E.2d 319).
213. 760 N.E.2d at 322.
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Surety Court listed several factors to determine whether a reinsured could
properly aggregate claims. 214 The factors were whether "those 'accidents,
occurrences and/or causative incidents' have a spatial or temporal relation-
ship to one another and a 'common origin.' "215 The Court determined that
"the parties did not intend for the reinsured to simply group together all
losses as a single 'disaster and/or casualty ... "'216 Therefore, the losses
could not be treated as having any common causative origin because they
involved discrete pollution problems that occurred in different parts of the
United States at different times. 217 This meant that the treatment of each site
as a separate "disaster and/or casualty" failed to pierce any of the reinsur-
ance treaties' retention levels. 218
However, Travelers Casualty and Surety also arguably sets forth a
method for treating the attack on the World Trade Center complex as a sin-
gle event for insurance purposes. 219 The Court of Appeals of New York's fo-
cus was on whether the underlying claims were closely linked in time and
space.220 This would imply that the two aircraft striking the adjoining twin
towers within minutes of each other, as a consequence of a coordinated at-
tack, constitute a single "occurrence. '"221
IV. CONCLUSION
"One must deal with an infinite number of causes and effects" in devis-
ing insurance policies.222 In Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
Judge Benjamin Cardozo said,
General definitions of proximate cause give little aid. Our guide is the rea-
sonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary businessman when mak-
ing an ordinary business contract. It is his intention, expressed or fairly to
be inferred, that counts. There are times when the law permits us to go far
back in tracing events to causes. The inquiry[] is how far the parties to
th[e] contract intended us to go.... That cause is to be held predominant
which they would think of as predominant. A common-sense appraise-
214. Id. at 327.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Twin Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the World Trade Center At-
tacks, supra note 142, at 169 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London, 760 N.E.2d 319).
218. 760 N.E.2d 327.
219. Twin Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the World Trade Center At-
tacks, supra note 142, at 169 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London, 760 N.E.2d 319).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Ozog, supra note 141, at 11.
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ment of everyday forms of speech and modes of thought must tell us when
to stop.
223
"The elasticity of the [term 'occurrence'] depends on the individual pol-
icy language to give it full meaning in light of the intentions of the par-
ties. '224 One insurance company contends that its use of the term "event" in
defining the term "occurrence" in its policy 225 makes it less ambiguous than
Travelers' policy. 226 However, the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York responds, "[w]hile reasonable people might consider the
attack on the World Trade Center as a single event, it is no less reasonable to
consider the separate hijackings of two aircraft and the ultimate crashing of
those aircraft into different buildings at different times as two separate
events. 227 Therefore, the issue of whether the events of September 11, 2001
constituted one or two occurrences must be decided by a jury.228
"One cannot have an occurrence under a property policy unless there is
a compensable 'loss.-'229 At least one New York court has "gone so far as to
say that 'occurrence' equals lOss. ' ' '23° "The phrase 'inception of the loss'
has been interpreted as 'equivalent to the occurrence of the casualty or event
insured against.' 231 If so, then it would seem two airplanes striking the
World Trade Center's twin towers created two losses, and therefore, two oc-
currences.
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
an airline brought suit against the insurers of its airplane, which was hijacked
in the sky over London by members of a Palestinian terrorist group and de-
stroyed in Egypt. 23 2 In determining "which of the various underwriters...
must bear the cost of the loss," '233 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rea-
soned, "[r]emote causes of causes are not relevant to the characterization of
an insurance lOss. ' '234 In the context of that litigation, the Court did "not trace
223. Id. (quoting Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 120 N.E. 86, 87 (N.Y. 1918)).
224. Id. at 10.
225. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2003 WL
554768, at *4.
226. Id. at *5.
227. Id.
228. Id. at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2003).
229. Ozog, supra note 141 at 10.
230. Id. (citing Margulies v. Quaker City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 97 N.Y.S.2d 100
(1950)).
231. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of New York v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 N.Y.S.2d 952,
953 (1993) (citing Margulies v. Quaker City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 97 N.Y.S.2d 100, 104
(1950)).
232. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir.
1974).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1006.
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events back to their metaphysical beginnings," instead stopping the causa-
tion inquiry "at the efficient physical cause of the loss.... 235 It noted, "[t]he
words 'due to or resulting from' within all-risk policies' exclusion of cover-
age of loss or damage due to or resulting from various enumerated perils, re-
ferred only to facts immediately surrounding the loss. ' 236
In its opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals quoted a passage
written by Mr. Justice Holmes that said,
[t]he common understanding is that in construing these policies we are not
to take broad views but generally are to stop our inquiries with the cause
nearest to the loss. This is a settled rule of construction, and if it is under-
stood, does not deserve much criticism, since theoretically at least the par-
ties can shape their contract as they like. 237
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "New York courts give es-
pecially limited scope to the causation inquiry. '"238 While discussing Bird v.
St. Paul Fire 239 the Court added, "[i]t [is] ascertained that the scope of cau-
sation relevant to the insurance nature of a loss is largely a question of fact
depending on the reasonable expectations of businessmen .... ,240 "'The
question is not what men ought to think of as a cause. The question is what
they do think of as a cause.' 24' The cases that the Court discussed "establish
a mechanical test of proximate causation for insurance cases, a test that looks
only to the 'cause[s] nearest to the loss. ' '-242
In reviewing Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
noted that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals said, "'if the insurer desires
to have more remote causes determine the scope of exclusion, he may draft
language to effectuate that desire.' 243 Therefore, any ambiguity in this re-
gard should be construed against the insurer under the maxim contra profer-
entum.'24 If the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
and Second Circuit Court of Appeals strictly apply a test of proximate causa-
235. Id.
236. Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54, 58 (1950)).
237. Id. (quoting Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487, 492
(1924)).
238. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1006.
239. Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47 (1918).
240. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1006.
241. Id. (quoting Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 52 (1918)).
242. Id. at 1007 (quoting Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487,
492 (1924)).
243. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(quoting Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1007).
244. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1007.
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tion that looks only to the "causes nearest to the loss," an inconsistent appli-
cation of New York's "unfortunate event" test may be avoided.245
Jon A. Baumunk*
245. In January 2002, Mr. Silverstein filed a summary judgment brief in which he argues
that the terrorists' plan was not the proximate cause of the losses and was, at best, an inconse-
quential remote cause. Citing Pan American World Airways, Inc., Mr. Silverstein argues that
"remote causes of losses are not relevant in the characterization of an insurance loss." Twin
Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the World Trade Center Attacks, supra note
142, at 171.I J.D. Candidate, January 2004, California Western School of Law; B.S., cum laude,
Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 1983. From 1983 to 1984, the author was employed
by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., in their New York District Office,
which was located on the 981h floor of the World Trade Center's South Tower. His insurance
background includes positions with The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York and
A.M. Best Company.
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